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STRATEGIC LAND USE LITIGATION: 
PLEADING AROUND MUNICIPAL 
INSURANCE 
CHRISTOPHER SERKIN* 
Abstract: Municipal insurance policies inevitably contain a curious exclusion 
of coverage for regulatory takings claims. Many courts have interpreted this ex-
clusion broadly, applying it to all land-use litigation. Other courts have inter-
preted the exclusion narrowly. Both interpretations are problematic. The former 
is at odds with policy language and the normal rule that insurance policies are to 
be construed against the insurer. The latter creates an opportunity for plaintiffs 
to craft their pleadings explicitly to trigger or to avoid triggering the municipali-
ty’s insurance coverage. Plaintiffs seeking a quick settlement are well advised to 
plead around the exclusion so as to settle with the insurer. But plaintiffs seeking 
to have the local government capitulate should avoid the insurance coverage, 
forcing the local government to bear its own litigation costs and the risk of an 
adverse judgment. The possibility of such pleading arbitrage is problematic, and 
this Article argues that states should find ways to extend insurance to cover Fifth 
Amendment regulatory takings claims. 
INTRODUCTION 
Municipalities deal with litigation risk in a variety of ways.1 Large cit-
ies typically self-insure, retaining the risk of liability themselves.2 Smaller 
municipalities, however, usually shift risk to a third party, either by purchas-
ing private insurance from an insurance company or by joining a municipal 
risk pool.3 In either case, a municipality can insure itself against costs asso-
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. My thanks for 
comments and suggestions go to Ed Cheng, Tracey George, and Kevin Stack. Thanks especially to 
Kathryn Murphree for excellent research assistance. 
 1 For a survey, see Christopher Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, 111 N.W. U. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2016) (draft on file with author). 
 2 JOHN MARTINEZ, 4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 27:31, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 
2015) (“[R]isk management plays a significant role in the practical world of local government 
administration, particularly in large cities which are often self-insurers.”). 
 3 See id.; see also Jason E. Doucette, Note, Wading in the Pool: Interlocal Cooperation in 
Municipal Insurance and the State Regulation of Public Entity Risk Sharing Pools—A Survey, 8 
CONN. INS. L.J. 533, 536 (2002) (“A public entity pool is a risk financing mechanism whereby a 
group of public entities contribute to a shared fund that in turn pays claims for and provides ser-
vices to the participating entity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ciated with all manner of litigation, whether arising out of alleged police 
misconduct, employment discrimination, car accidents, or other sources of 
liability.4 One risk that local governments cannot insure, however, is the 
risk of regulatory takings liability and the litigation costs associated with 
such takings claims.5 Municipal insurance policies contain an exclusion of 
coverage for claims arising out of inverse condemnation.6 In a forthcoming 
article, I explore this lacunae in municipal insurance, and argue that the un-
availability of regulatory takings insurance may lead smaller local govern-
ments to under-regulate and to under-enforce existing regulations.7 
The absence of regulatory takings insurance creates another problem, 
however, that has so far gone unrecognized in the scholarly literature. In at 
least some jurisdictions, insurance is available for other land use litigation, 
like § 1983 claims for due process or equal protection violations, adminis-
trative challenges, and other state law causes of action.8 Where that is true, 
plaintiffs challenging land use regulations have an important strategic ad-
vantage in choosing whether or not to trigger the municipality’s insurance 
coverage. A plaintiff seeking damages is well advised to plead a claim that 
triggers municipal insurance. The insurance company will be obligated to 
defend the action and will often settle claims so long as they are at least 
colorable (and sometimes even if they are not). But if a plaintiff instead 
wants the government to capitulate and withdraw the offending regulation, 
then the better course of action is to plead a regulatory takings claim alone. 
In that case, the government will be faced with paying both litigation costs 
and any resulting liability out of its general operating funds. For many local 
governments, the potential costs are sufficiently high that they will quickly 
                                                                                                                 
 4 See Serkin, supra note 1, at 17–23 (describing coverage provided by private insurance). 
 5 See id. at 25–29 (discussing the exclusion for regulatory takings claims). The only exception 
appears to be Minnesota, where the municipal risk pool explicitly provides coverage for regulatory 
takings litigation. See id. 
 6 See, e.g., S.C. Mun. Ins. & Risk Fund v. City of Myrtle Beach, 628 S.E.2d 276, 277 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 2006) (discussing state municipal insurance containing an inverse condemnation exclu-
sion). Precise language varies, but policies include some version of the following exclusion of 
coverage: “Claims arising out of or in connection with inverse condemnation caused by the con-
struction of a public work or public improvement, land use regulation, land use planning, the prin-
ciples of eminent domain, or condemnation proceedings by whatever name called . . . .” VECTOR 
CONTROL JOINT POWERS AGENCY, POOLED LIABILITY PROGRAM MEMORANDUM OF COVERAGE 
FOR THE 2013/2014 PROGRAM YEAR 1, 12 (n.d.), http://www.vcjpa.org/DesktopModules/Bring2
mind/DMX/Download.aspx?EntryId=10743&Command=Core_Download&PortalId=13&TabId=
572 [https://perma.cc/GZ75-KRZW] (emphasis added). 
 7 See Serkin, supra note 1, at 34–39 (describing distributional consequences of the regulatory 
takings exclusion). 
 8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
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withdraw the challenged regulation rather than face the risk of liability and 
associated litigation costs. 
These dynamics are increasingly important because local governments 
are often at the front lines of climate change adaptation—hence this Arti-
cle’s inclusion in the excellent symposium on insurance and climate change.9 
Local regulatory responses to sea level rise, for example, can include in-
creased set-backs, preservation of wetlands and other soft armoring, as well 
as imposition of tough new building codes focusing on resiliency.10 All of 
these can burden property and give rise to takings claims.11 Property owners 
seeking exemptions from new regulatory burdens can—at least in some cir-
cumstances—take advantage of these strategic opportunities by pleading 
around insurance. 
Whether this strategic decision is available to plaintiffs depends upon 
how courts—and insurance companies themselves—interpret the breadth of 
the inverse condemnation exclusion. Courts that interpret the exclusion 
broadly deny insurance coverage for all land use claims, taking away the op-
portunity for strategic pleading. In the process, however, those courts stretch 
and distort the policy language. This Article explores courts’ competing inter-
pretations of the inverse condemnation exclusion that is standard across 
municipal insurance policies.12 Each interpretation presents its own prob-
lems.13 This Article then proposes that insurance should be more readily 
available for regulatory takings claims.14 
I. COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE INVERSE CONDEMNATION 
EXCLUSION 
A. The Inverse Condemnation Exclusion 
Municipal insurance—and risk management practices more broadly—
have received very little scholarly attention. For a brief period during an 
insurance crisis in the 1980s, scholars focused on the problem of municipal 
                                                                                                                 
 9 Elizabeth C. Black, Climate Change Adaptation: Local Solutions for a Global Problem, 22 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 360 (2010) (“[A]daptation efforts largely involve local decision-
making.”). 
 10 See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect 
Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 389–94 (2014) (describing local adaptation). 
 11 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–27 (1978) (setting 
forth the test for establishing regulatory takings liability); Serkin, supra note 10, at 390–91 (de-
scribing possible takings claims from the regulatory response to sea-level rise). 
 12 See infra notes 15–107 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 108–145 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 146–155 and accompanying text. 
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risk, but that attention waned once insurance markets opened up again.15 As 
a result, important gaps in coverage have gone largely if not entirely unno-
ticed in academic literature. Among the most important is the exclusion for 
regulatory takings claims. To understand its impact, however, one must first 
understand at least the basic outlines of insurance coverage generally. 
Insurance policies provide coverage for pre-specified losses, subject to 
certain pre-specified exclusions. Where a loss falls within a policy’s cover-
age, the insurance company is obligated both to defend the litigation and to 
pay any resulting judgment in accordance with the policy limits.16 An insur-
ance company’s duty to defend is, in fact, broader than its duty to indemni-
fy, and is generally governed by the aptly-named “eight-corners rule.”17 The 
four corners of the complaint are compared with the four corners of the pol-
icy.18 If the complaint sets forth claims that fall within a covered loss, the 
insurer must defend. 
Municipal insurance policies can take a number of forms and can pro-
vide coverage for many different kinds of risks. Most importantly here, a 
municipality’s general liability policy insures against occurrences resulting 
in bodily injury or property damage, while an errors and omissions 
(“E&O”) policy insures against harms resulting from decisions by munici-
pal officials and employees.19 The latter might include, for example, liabil-
ity arising out of the adoption of a discriminatory hiring policy. Land use 
litigation can implicate both types of polices. But both types of policies also 
contain an important exclusion for condemnation and inverse condemna-
tion. Language varies by policy, but typically excludes coverage for “any 
injury or damage arising out of or resulting from a taking that involves or is 
in any way related to the principles of eminent domain, [or] inverse con-
demnation . . . .”20 
                                                                                                                 
 15 See, e.g., Richard N. Clark et al., Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic 
Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367, 369–71 (1988); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis 
and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521–22 (1987); see also James R. Hackney, Jr., Note, 
A Proposal for State Funding of Municipal Tort Liability, 98 YALE L.J. 389, 407 nn.2–3 (1988) 
(collecting sources). 
 16 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALIA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 200:3 (3d ed. 2007). 
 17 Nutmeg Ins. Co. v. Clear Lake Water Auth., 229 F. Supp. 2d 668, 675–76 (S.D. Tex. 
2002); see also Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Liability Regime and the Duty to Defend, 58 MD. L. REV. 
1, 23 (1999) (describing eight-corners rule). 
 18 Nutmeg Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 674. 
 19 See, e.g., N.C. DEP’T OF STATE TREASURER, POLICY MANUAL FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: 
SECTION 85: INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 23–34 (2014), https://www.nctreasurer.com/
slg/Policies%20Manual/85policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3V9-BKWW] (describing types of policies). 
 20 See, e.g., SUSAN J. MILLER, I MILLER’S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 
§ 14b, GL-116 (7th ed. 2013). 
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Inverse condemnation—referenced in the exclusion—is the state law 
cause of action for vindicating regulatory takings claims.21 It amounts to an 
eminent domain action triggered by the property owner instead of by the 
government, and it is a prerequisite for suing in federal court.22 Where a 
party brings a state inverse condemnation action, however, issue preclusion 
applies to prevent subsequent litigation in federal court.23 As a result, in-
verse condemnation is, for all intents and purposes, the exclusive means of 
vindicating regulatory takings claims against the state or subdivisions of the 
state.24 The exclusion of insurance coverage for inverse condemnation is, 
therefore, an exclusion of insurance coverage for regulatory takings claims 
against municipalities. 
The absence of insurance for regulatory takings is not widely known in 
land use literature. This absence can have profound consequences for local 
governments’ regulatory incentives, as I argue in another article.25 It can 
also affect plaintiffs’ strategic pleading decisions, depending on how broad-
ly the exclusion is interpreted.26 As it turns out, courts have adopted two 
very different interpretations of the inverse condemnation exclusion.27 
B. Judicial Interpretations of the Exclusion 
When it comes to interpreting insurance policies, most courts have 
held that ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer.28 But that is 
not, in fact, the approach most courts have taken when it comes to interpret-
ing the inverse condemnation exclusion.29 Indeed, instead of limiting the 
exclusion to claims for inverse condemnation, many courts have held that 
the exclusion applies to all claims arising out of land use litigation, includ-
                                                                                                                 
 21 Cynthia J. Barnes, Comment, Just Compensation or Just Damages: The Measure of Dam-
ages for Temporary Regulatory Takings in Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 74 IOWA L. REV. 
1243, 1246–47 (1989) (“The cause of action is inverse because it is brought by the landowner 
rather than by the condemnor.”). 
 22 See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 199–200 
(1985) (requiring for federal ripeness that property owners first seek compensation from the state 
through inverse condemnation). 
 23 See San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 338 (2005). 
 24 See id.; see also Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
553, 605 (2012) (describing inverse condemnation). 
 25 See Serkin, supra note 1, at 31–34. 
 26 See infra notes 108–145 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 31–97 and accompanying text. 
 28 See Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
531, 531–32 (1996) (“The first principle of insurance law is captured by the maxim contra 
proferentem, which directs that ambiguities in a contract be interpreted ‘against the drafter,’ who 
is almost always the insurer.”) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 29 See infra notes 31–97 and accompanying text. 
468 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:463 
ing due process and equal protection claims, Fair Housing Act claims, and 
beyond.30 This approach represents anything but a conservative interpreta-
tion of the policy language. 
Consider the following two examples. In Nutmeg Insurance Co. v. 
Clear Lake City Water Authority, four real estate developers built out sewer 
and drainage facilities for new residential developments, and entered into 
contracts with Clear Lake City Water (“Clear Lake Water”), a water control 
district, to purchase those facilities.31 Clear Lake Water failed to obtain 
funding for the acquisition—allegedly because it undermined a series of 
bond elections—and so did not complete the acquisition.32 The facilities 
nevertheless continued to provide water and sewer service to the develop-
ments.33 The developers sued, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrich-
ment, and inverse condemnation for accepting the ongoing use of the facili-
ties.34 They won a jury award of $1.5 million.35 In a subsequent suit by 
Clear Lake Water against its insurer, however, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled that the inverse condemnation 
exclusion applied.36 It reasoned: “Claimants’ breach of contract and quan-
tum meruit claims do logically arise out of the unconstitutional taking 
claim.”37 As a result, the insurance company did not have to provide a de-
fense against any of these claims, nor indemnity for the loss.38 
In Columbia Casualty Co. v. City of St. Clairsville, the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio refused to apply Nutmeg 
quite so broadly, but nevertheless extended the inverse condemnation exclu-
sion to both due process and equal protection claims.39 There, a third party 
                                                                                                                 
 30 Transcon. Ins. Co. v. City of San Bernardino, No. 88-6590, 1990 WL 20819, at *1 (9th Cir. 
Mar. 7, 1990); County of Boise v. Idaho Ctys. Risk Mgmt. Program, 265 P.3d 514, 518 (Idaho 
2011); S.C. Mun. Ins. & Risk Fund v. City of Myrtle Beach, 628 S.E.2d 276, 278–79 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 2006) (holding that the inverse condemnation exclusion applied to equal protection and due 
process claims arising out of a rule making landlords secondarily liable for tenants’ water bills); 
see also, e.g., Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. V.I. Port Auth., 48 V.I. 696, 703 (2007) (“The ‘arising out 
of’ language suggests that a claim need bear only an incidental relationship to the described con-
duct for the exclusion to apply.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Trumpeter Devs., LLC v. 
Pierce County, 681 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (“[W]e must look at the incident giv-
ing rise to [the property owner’s] claim, not the theory of liability.”). 
 31 229 F. Supp. 2d 668, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 677–78. 
 35 Id. at 678. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 696. The district court rejected other aspects of the plaintiff’s claim under different 
exclusions relating to bond elections. Id. 
 38 See id. 
 39 No. 05-898, 2007 WL 756706, at *1, 10–11 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2007). 
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owned land that the City of St. Clairsville (the “City”) wanted to acquire to 
build a welcome center.40 When the property owner refused to donate the 
land, the City allegedly engaged in a “pattern of harassment” to reduce the 
value of the property and induce him to sell at a discounted price.41 Specifi-
cally, according to the property owner, the City fraudulently inflated water 
and electricity bills on the property, filed fraudulent liens, and downzoned 
the property, interfering with his plans to sell the property.42 The property 
owner sued, alleging tortious interference with contract, inverse condemna-
tion, violations of due process and equal protection, conspiracy, and others. 
The City’s insurer brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking a deter-
mination that it was not obligated to defend or to indemnify the City be-
cause the underlying litigation fell entirely within the inverse condemnation 
exclusion.43 
The district court distinguished Nutmeg, and found that the tortious in-
terference claim (as well as a “wrongful annexation” and civil conspiracy 
claim) did not fall within the inverse condemnation exclusion because the 
property owner would not need to “show the existence of a taking to pre-
vail.”44 The insurance company therefore had a duty to defend the underly-
ing litigation because of those claims. But the district court also held that 
the inverse condemnation applied not only to the regulatory takings claim 
itself, but also to the equal protection and due process claims.45 The district 
court focused on the fact that the complaint did not clearly articulate the 
bases for the alleged equal protection and due process violations, and ulti-
mately concluded that these claims and the regulatory takings claim were 
“functionally equivalent.”46 
Even in the absence of more detailed allegations, this is not an obvious 
conclusion. After all, these other claims are very different causes of action 
that implicate fundamentally different analyses than inverse condemnation. 
Consider, first, the inverse condemnation claim. The Takings Clause prohib-
its government regulations that impose too great a burden on private proper-
ty rights—those that “go too far” as defined by the United States Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 40 Id. at *1. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at *1–2. 
 43 Id. at *1. 
 44 Id. at *12. 
 45 Id. at *10–11. Although there needs to be only one basis for the insurance company’s duty 
to defend, the breadth of the exclusion is still important because if some claims in the underlying 
action are dismissed pre-trial, the insurance company’s duty to defend could disappear. 
 46 Id. at *11. 
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Court—unless just compensation is paid.47 For land use regulations, the 
resolution of a takings claim will turn on the extent to which the regulation 
interferes with the developer’s investment-backed expectations, and the re-
sulting diminution in value of the property.48 This will require analyzing 
how much the developer has already spent on its plans to develop the prop-
erty, whether the developer’s expectations were reasonable considering both 
the parcel of land and the neighborhood more generally, and what other uses 
remain available for the property after the regulation.49 
The substantive due process inquiry is fundamentally different. While 
successful economic substantive due process claims remain vanishingly rare 
in most contexts, land use regulations are occasionally—if still uncommon-
ly—invalidated on substantive due process grounds.50 The background test, 
familiar from other regulatory contexts, asks whether the challenged regula-
tion is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.51 In applica-
tion, many courts treat this as a kind of de facto cost-benefit analysis.52 Alt-
hough the review is deferential, courts ask whether the regulation generates 
more benefits to the public than harm to the burdened property owner.53 
The focus on the harm to the burdened property owner is, of course, 
similar to the takings test.54 The extent of the burden is reflected in the dim-
inution in value of the property.55 But takings analysis does not explicitly 
include consideration of the benefits to the public, which is a central com-
                                                                                                                 
 47 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (setting out 
the takings test); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (recognizing regulatory takings 
as regulations that “go too far”); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–38 
(2005) (synthesizing takings law). 
 48 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. A third factor focuses on the character of the 
regulation. Id. For most land use regulations, little turns on that third factor. 
 49 For a discussion of the transformation of the test from “distinct” to “reasonable” invest-
ment-backed expectations, see Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Reg-
ulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1229 (2009) (citing, inter alia, Daniel R. Mandelker, The No-
tice Rule in Investment-Backed Expectations, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 21, 21–29 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002)). 
 50 See, e.g., Twigg v. County of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742, 744–45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
 51 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 102 (2014) (citing cases in 
which the rational basis test for land use regulation was applied). 
 52 See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464–65 (7th Cir. 
1988) (weighing the costs and benefits of the regulation in question). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Compare id. at 465 (describing the substantive due process inquiry), with Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–27 (1978) (describing the test for regulatory 
takings). 
 55 Coniston Corp., 844 F.2d at 466 (measuring a deprivation by diminution in value). 
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ponent of due process review.56 In mounting a defense to a due process 
claim, the City of Clairsville could have argued that it had good reasons for 
downzoning the subject property—perhaps traffic congestion, burdens on 
infrastructure, and the like—while the property owner could have argued 
that the reasons were either pretextual or insufficient to justify the substan-
tial burden on his land.57 Importantly, again, due process involves a balanc-
ing of burdens and benefits, while inverse condemnation focuses only on 
the extent of the burden in absolute terms.58 
Equal protection claims in the land use context can take various forms. 
If a suspect classification is implicated—within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment—then the regulation may trigger heightened scrutiny, 
and the regulation must be necessary for a compelling government purpose.59 
As interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, however, the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits only de jure and not de facto discrimination.60 As 
a result, many property and housing-related claims implicating suspect clas-
sifications are much more frequently litigated under the Fair Housing Act 
than under the Equal Protection Clause itself.61 
Even where a suspect classification is not at issue—as with the plain-
tiff property owner who claims that he was singled out because he owned 
property that the City of Clairsville wanted to acquire—the Equal Protec-
tion Clause still prohibits irrational and arbitrary line-drawing.62 Again, this 
inquiry is different from both the takings and due process inquiries.63 In 
fact, the substance of each of these claims is demonstrably different from 
                                                                                                                 
 56 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005) (rejecting the argument that 
takings claims require evaluating whether the regulation substantially advances a government 
interest). 
 57 There are more specialized tests that still sound in due process but trigger more searching 
review, like the test for spot-zoning, or review for adjudicative versus legislative actions. See, e.g., 
Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Alaska 1996) (discussing spot zoning); Bd. of 
Cty. Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 470–71 (Fla. 1993) (discussing judicial review for legis-
lative acts as opposed to quasi-adjudicative decision-making). 
 58 Compare Coniston Corp., 844 F.2d at 464–65 (weighing costs and benefits to the private 
property owner), with Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 418 (1922) (considering the burden 
imposed on private property owners by regulatory takings that “go too far”). 
 59 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215–21 (1982). 
 60 See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 372 (1991). 
 61 See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 
2507, 2514, 2525–26 (2015) (affirming a lower standard for liability under the Fair Housing Act 
than under the Equal Protection Clause, and noting that “disparate-impact claims are cognizable 
under the Fair Housing Act”). 
 62 See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565–66 (2000) (evaluating a so-called 
“class of one” equal protection claim). 
 63 Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 418 (considering the burden imposed on private property owners 
by regulatory takings that “go too far”); Coniston Corp., 844 F.2d at 464–65 (weighing costs and 
benefits to the private property owner). 
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the substance of an inverse condemnation claim.64 It is therefore very diffi-
cult to see why the inverse condemnation exclusion should ever be 
stretched to cover them. 
Some might object to the specificity of this analysis. Courts’ expansive 
reading of the inverse condemnation exclusion may be based on a broader 
concern about insurable risks. Courts may at least implicitly assume that 
policy decisions, like land use regulations, are not covered by insurance 
because they are not fortuitous events.65 Extending the inverse condemna-
tion exclusion makes good sense if the underlying purpose is to exclude 
coverage for affirmative government decision-making. But this proves too 
much. Recall that most land use litigation implicates a municipality’s E&O 
policy.66 Those policies are explicitly designed to provide coverage for af-
firmative policy decisions (whether actions or omissions).67 If a local agen-
cy adopts a discriminatory hiring policy, for example, resulting litigation 
can trigger the municipal E&O policy.68 Likewise, if a schoolteacher abuses 
a student, or a police officer violates someone’s rights, municipal insurance 
is available.69 There is no principled reason to distinguish land use decisions 
from these other insurable municipal actions.70 
Ultimately, the inverse condemnation exclusion is not usually phrased 
as an exclusion for land use regulations.71 It is not an exclusion for all lia-
bility arising out of zoning decisions or the decisions of zoning officials. It 
is, instead, an exclusion for inverse condemnation claims. Given that lan-
guage and the rule that ambiguities in policy language are to be construed 
                                                                                                                 
 64 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (describing the exclusive 
focus of regulatory takings claims as the “burden that government imposes upon private property 
rights”). 
 65 Gary Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. 
REV. 313, 341 (1990). 
 66 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 67 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 68 See, e.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 697, Eveleth v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 
576, 578–79 (Minn. 1994) (finding that the insurer had a duty to indemnify the school district for 
altering the duties of a secretary based on a theory of age discrimination because the E&O policy 
coverage for “wrongful acts” included intentional age discrimination absent an express exclusion). 
 69 See, e.g., Durham City Bd. of Educ. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 426 S.E.2d 451, 457 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (requiring insurer to indemnify school board for negligent supervision aris-
ing out of alleged rape by basketball coach). 
 70 See Serkin, supra note 1 (comparing regulatory takings claims with other claims for which 
municipal insurance is available). 
 71 But see Village of Waterford v. Reliance Ins. Co., 226 A.D.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996) (excluding coverage “[f]or damages arising out of or in any way connected with the actions 
of any administrative board . . . [that arises] out of . . . Land Use Planning; or Municipal Zoning”). 
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against the insurer, courts’ extremely broad interpretations of the inverse 
condemnation exclusion appear unjustifiable.72 
Not all courts adopt such a broad reading of the inverse condemnation 
exclusion. In Town of Cumberland v. Rhode Island Interlocal Risk Man-
agement Trust, Inc., property owners sought permission to subdivide their 
property.73 The town planning board denied the subdivision applications, 
erroneously applying new stricter standards.74 In the underlying litigation, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the town tortuously interfered 
with the property owners’ economic advantage, and also violated the prop-
erty owners’ substantive and procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.75 The parties settled for $1.6 million.76 In subsequent litigation by 
the town seeking indemnification from its insurer, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court rejected the insurer’s argument that the policy’s inverse con-
demnation exclusion applied.77 The court held that the lower court clearly 
found a violation of the Due Process Clause and not the Takings Clause.78 
The recent case, City of College Station, Texas v. Star Insurance Co., is 
another example.79 A developer, Weingarten Realty Trust (“WRI”), sued the 
City of College Station (the “City”) for various zoning decisions regarding 
property that it acquired in 2006 for fourteen million dollars in order to de-
velop a Wal-Mart.80 WRI’s plans for the property required a rezoning for 
commercial use.81 WRI claimed that such a rezoning was consistent with 
the City’s comprehensive plan, and indeed the City’s planning staff recom-
mended the rezoning.82 Nevertheless, the City denied WRI’s rezoning re-
quest, allegedly because of animus towards Wal-Mart.83 WRI submitted 
additional zoning requests and found new anchor tenants to replace Wal-
Mart.84 The City continued to deny the rezoning and imposed additional 
                                                                                                                 
 72 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 73 860 A.2d 1210, 1212 (R.I. 2004). 
 74 Id. 
 75 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); R.I. Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Tr., 860 A.2d at 1213. 
 76 R.I. Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Tr., 860 A.2d at 1213. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 1217. The Court also observed that “the claim against the town alleging inverse con-
demnation was withdrawn before trial.” Id. 
 79 735 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 80 City of College Station v. Star Ins. Co., No. 11-2023, 2012 WL 4867568, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 
Oct. 12, 2012), rev’d, 735 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2013). The facts were more developed in the trial 
court decision, and so are taken from there. 
 81 Id. at *1–2. 
 82 Id. at *1. 
 83 Id. at *2. 
 84 Id. 
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conditions on the use of the property.85 Finally, in 2009, the City revised its 
comprehensive plan, designating a significant amount of WRI’s property for 
much less intensive commercial and suburban use.86 
WRI successfully sued, alleging that the City’s zoning decisions were 
arbitrary and capricious in violation of substantive due process, amounted 
to unequal treatment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, should 
have been estopped due to WRI’s detrimental reliance, intentionally inter-
fered with WRI’s contracts and business relations, and violated the Takings 
Clause in the Texas Constitution.87 The City settled the litigation for $1.6 
million after incurring approximately $2 million in defense costs.88 The 
City then sought indemnification from Star Insurance Company, which un-
derwrote an applicable E&O policy that contained an inverse condemnation 
exclusion.89 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the inverse con-
demnation exclusion precluded coverage for all of the claims, including the 
tortious interference with contract, equal protection, and substantive due 
process claims.90 Even though each of these different claims implicated 
fundamentally different legal analyses, the district court read the inverse 
condemnation exclusion as applying to all of them.91 
On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit reversed.92 The appellate court went through the various claims in 
the complaint and concluded that they were independent of—and did not 
arise out of—the inverse condemnation claim.93 As the court reasoned, the 
equal protection claim did not depend upon the inverse condemnation 
claim: 
Suppose that a municipality has a policy or custom of imposing 
zoning restrictions on properties purchased by racial minorities—
restrictions that do not physically intrude on the properties and 
reduce their value by only about 1%. No one would argue that 
such restrictions amount to regulatory takings; however, the mu-
                                                                                                                 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at *9 n.7. 
 89 The policy excluded claims: “[A]ctually or allegedly arising out of or caused or contributed 
to by or in any way connected with any principle of eminent domain, condemnation proceeding, 
inverse condemnation, dedication by adverse use or adverse possession, by whatever name 
called.” Id. at *1 (emphasis added). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 City of College Station v. Star Ins. Co., 735 F.3d 332, 340 (2013). 
 93 Id. at 338–39. 
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nicipality would still be liable for violating the Equal Protection 
Clause. To say that the municipality's liability in such circum-
stances “arises out of” an “inverse condemnation” action is un-
tenable—the liability arises out of the city’s constitutional mal-
feasance. And the same general logic applies here.94 
This was true of the substantive due process, and tortious interference 
claims as well.95 The Fifth Circuit observed that the relevant policy lan-
guage did not exclude coverage for all actions arising out of zoning deci-
sions, but only actions arising out of inverse condemnation, and that is nec-
essarily a narrower exclusion and inapplicable to these other claims.96 Some 
other courts have similarly limited the inverse condemnation exclusion.97 
While this interpretation is convincing as an interpretive matter and 
appears much more consistent with the policy language, it raises its own 
interesting and less obvious problem. By creating a specific and narrowly 
defined hole in municipal insurance coverage—for regulatory takings 
claims alone—it creates an opportunity for plaintiffs to choose whether or 
not to trigger the municipality’s insurance. This, in turn, can dramatically 
affect litigation dynamics and in many cases can all but determine remedies 
and outcomes.98 
Uninsured regulatory takings litigation presents a substantial risk to 
municipal governments. Even if most regulatory takings claims ultimately 
fail, litigation costs alone can be substantial.99 Moreover, not all claims fail, 
                                                                                                                 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 339–40 (“SIC’s policy did not exclude all liability arising out of any zoning deci-
sions, as some municipal liability insurance policies do.”). 
 97 See City of Hartsville v. S.C. Mun. Ins. & Risk Fin. Fund, 677 S.E.2d 574, 579 (S.C. 2009) 
(requiring the insurer to defend against the conspiracy claim based on the underlying inverse con-
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see TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 49 (2010) (“[T]he 
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their pleadings to avoid coming within the exclusion.”) and Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: 
Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1721, 1735–38 (1997). 
 99 James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, Takings on the Ground: An Empirical Study (draft on 
file with author) (coding and cataloguing regulatory takings claims and demonstrating that most 
claims fail); see Susan A. Macmanus, The Impact of Litigation on Municipalities: Total Cost, 
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and the impact of a successful claim can be devastating. If the municipality 
is small enough, and the judgment large enough, regulatory takings liability 
can even manifest as an existential threat.100 The result—at least for smaller 
municipalities that typically buy insurance—is a predictable aversion to the 
risk of uninsured takings litigation.101 A developer that even threatens tak-
ings litigation over some regulatory action or inaction can often induce a 
small local government to back down. Therefore, a developer who wants 
the government to capitulate to his or her demands is well advised to bring 
only a regulatory takings claim. Adding additional insured claims to the mix 
will at least require the insurer to defend the litigation and make it easier for 
the government to stick to its guns. 
On the other hand, if a developer is seeking a quick financial settle-
ment instead of regulatory capitulation, he or she should seek to trigger the 
municipality’s insurance coverage. Faced with the costs of defending the 
action, and any potential liability, an insurer is more likely to offer to set-
tle.102 This is no get-rich-quick scheme for developers since sophisticated 
insurers are good at pricing claims and evaluating litigation costs and risks. 
Nevertheless, there is at least a good chance that an insurer will make a 
meaningful settlement offer early in any litigation to avoid all of the costs 
associated with defending the action.103 
This dynamic only exists, however, where courts have interpreted the 
inverse condemnation exclusion narrowly.104 It also only exists where de-
velopers can, in fact, choose between different causes of action.105 As dis-
cussed above, the substance of the various legal protections for property 
                                                                                                                 
Driving Factors, and Cost Containment Mechanisms, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 833, 844–45 (1993) 
(finding that increasing litigation costs, totaling $6.45 billion in 1991, caused budgetary issues for 
municipalities and noting that land use litigation was one source of particularly expensive suits). 
 100 See, e.g., John Coté, Half Moon Bay Grapples with $36.8 Million Judgment Against It, 
SFGATE (Dec. 18, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Half-Moon-Bay-
grapples-with-36-8-million-3234399.php [https://perma.cc/8GC9-DT6K] (quoting a county su-
pervisor as saying: “One of the options, candidly, is . . . to dissolve . . . . That’s an extreme. But 
when you get a judgment of $36 million plus legal fees . . . even if you were able to finance it and 
stretch it out over a period of time, you would need significant reductions in your level of service 
to pay that off.”). 
 101 See Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and 
the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1624 (2006) (arguing that small local governments 
are risk averse). 
 102 See Pryor, supra note 17, at 6 (“Plaintiffs’ lawyers often plead lawsuits in a way designed 
to trigger a duty to defend even when there is quite likely no ultimate indemnity coverage. The 
hope is that . . . the insurer will cover at least part of the tort liability.”). 
 103 See, e.g., Pryor, supra note 98, at 1732 (discussing settlement pressures on insurers). 
 104 See supra notes 73–103 and accompanying text. 
 105 See supra notes 73–103 and accompanying text. 
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owners differs considerably from the substance of takings protection.106 
Nevertheless, developers often have the ability to pick and choose among a 
host of claims through artful pleading and creative construction of legal 
protections.107 This dynamic is easiest to see by looking closely at some 
different regulatory contexts in which diverse claims might arise. 
II. THE VARIOUS CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF LAND USE ACTIONS 
Land use litigation takes many different forms and arises in many dif-
ferent regulatory contexts. It is frequently the case, however, that a property 
owner or developer could fashion a claim that either does or does not trig-
ger the municipality’s insurance, depending on the desired litigation out-
come. Every case is different, and facts supporting a claim in one case may 
not arise in another. This Part therefore does not purport to canvass the 
range of potential claims in any comprehensive way. It seeks, instead, to 
capture, through a stylized example, the typical claims that may arise. 
Imagine, then, a developer who owns a parcel of undeveloped beach-
front land. She is seeking to build a significant number of residential units 
for sale. Imagine further, for the moment, that the property is currently 
zoned to permit the density of development she is planning. The municipali-
ty, however, decides that the property is particularly susceptible to flooding 
due to sea level rise, and that the development would dramatically increase 
the economic costs of such flooding. In this case, the municipality might 
downzone the property, reducing—perhaps dramatically—the number of 
units that can be developed on the parcel. A change, for example, from 
quarter-acre to two-acre minimum lot sizes will reduce the number of units 
eight-fold while also preserving permeable land and, perhaps, soft armor-
ing. The municipality might even impose new setbacks, all but eliminating 
the parcel’s development potential. 
Confronted with a downzoning, the developer in this example has a 
number of possible legal claims. The most obvious is a regulatory takings 
claim. As William Fischel has argued, undeveloped land is particularly sus-
ceptible to regulatory burdens because the property owner is unlikely to 
have significant political power and exit from the jurisdiction is impossi-
ble.108 For that reason, Fischel believes that regulatory takings protection 
should be at its greatest when it comes to protecting undeveloped proper-
ty.109 Takings claims are in fact a commonplace response (or threatened re-
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 107 See infra notes 108–145 and accompanying text. 
 108 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 139, 282 (1995). 
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sponse) to downzonings.110 While they rarely win, they are frequently col-
orable, especially if the downzoning is significant.111 
But the developer has other possible claims to pursue in addition or in 
the alternative. In this example, the downzoning applies to the developer’s 
property only, as sometimes happens when the zoning action is in response 
to a particular development pressure.112 This can give rise to a reverse spot 
zoning claim, or a substantive due process claim more generally.113 
Reverse spot zoning sounds fundamentally in due process, although it 
has taken on a kind of life of its own.114 A reverse spot zoning claim chal-
lenges the validity of a zoning decision that singles out too small a piece of 
land for adverse treatment, especially when the zoning action is inconsistent 
with the comprehensive plan or appears otherwise unjustified by anything 
innate to the regulated parcel.115 By labeling a zoning action spot zoning, a 
court will apply a more searching review than would otherwise apply to a 
substantive due process claim.116 
Even where reverse spot zoning is not at issue—perhaps because the 
downzoning affects too great an area—a developer can still bring a substan-
tive due process claim, arguing that the downzoning is arbitrary or irration-
al.117 That claim is more likely to survive in the context of land use than in 
other areas of the law.118 In fact, as noted above, property owners can some-
times actually win as applied substantive due process claims, even when 
courts apply rational basis review.119 Furthermore, given the political con-
troversy surrounding sea level rise, not all courts may view climate-based 
regulatory justifications favorably.120 While successful cases are undoubted-
ly rare, they are not unknown. 
In addition to these claims, the developer may also have an equal pro-
tection claim, arguing that she has been singled out for disfavored treat-
                                                                                                                 
 110 Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Downzoning, Fairness and Farmland Protection, 19 J. LAND USE 
60, 63 (2003). 
 111 Id. at 65. 
 112 Adesoji O. Adejala & Paul D. Gottlieb, The Political Economy of Downzoning, 38 AGRIC. 
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 113 See, e.g., In re Appeal of Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d 718, 721 (Pa. 
2003) (identifying reverse spot zoning). 
 114 See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 51, at 100–05, 395–400 (describing and collecting 
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 116 See id. 
 117 See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 118 See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 119 See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 120 Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-107.1 (2015) (prohibiting development of projections of sea 
level rise, except as specifically prescribed). 
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ment.121 Here, she might argue that other similarly situated property was not 
downzoned.122 If she was attempting to build affordable housing—a com-
monplace context for land use litigation—she might also bring a discrimina-
tion claim under the Fair Housing Act or, at least in New Jersey, a claim pur-
suant to Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Lau-
rel, on the grounds that the municipality was impermissibly pursuing its 
own parochial interests at the cost of its neighbors.123 In addition to all of 
these, the developer might also have procedural due process claims, and 
state statutory claims under the state zoning enabling act or coastal zone 
management plan, if there is one. 
All of these kinds of claims could also arise in many other regulatory 
contexts. If, instead of downzoning the property, the municipality refused to 
upzone the property to permit the development, this could also generate the 
same list of claims.124 Likewise, the denial of a subdivision permit, variance, 
or other necessary regulatory approval could trigger the same kinds of claims. 
Notice, then, that the plaintiff in this example, like in so many land use 
examples, has a range of options she could pursue.125 In the typical course, 
she will pursue all of them. But the municipality’s insurance coverage might 
affect that choice. Now, if she wants to force the municipality to pay its own 
litigation costs and face the prospect of uninsured liability, she can bring 
only the regulatory takings claim, filing exclusively an inverse condemna-
tion action in state court.126 However broadly or narrowly the inverse con-
demnation exclusion is interpreted in the jurisdiction, it will certainly apply 
in this case.127 This, in turn, can create substantial leverage for the develop-
er; it is conventional wisdom that municipalities will often withdraw of-
fending regulations rather than pay compensation to enforce them.128 In the 
example here, the municipality may withdraw the downzoning, issue the 
subdivision permit, or otherwise capitulate to the developer’s regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
 121 See supra note 79–94 and accompanying text. 
 122 See, e.g., Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565–66 (2000) (holding that 
“class of one” equal protection claims do not require showing of animus). 
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demands. A municipality will of course not always cave in, but the financial 
pressure to do so may be acute, especially for smaller local governments. 
If, however, the developer wants to trigger the insurance coverage, 
perhaps to induce a quick settlement, she needs only to include one of the 
other possible claims, at least where courts have narrowly construed the 
inverse condemnation exclusion.129 The presence of the insurer increases 
the possibility of a quick settlement offer, allowing the developer to obtain 
some money even if it does not make her whole.130 
Some might wonder why a developer would ever seek settlement 
money instead of the increased leverage that comes with a takings claim. 
After all, this is not a context in which insurance provides the only source 
of funds to pay an adverse judgment.131 Local governments have the ability 
to pay, even if they do not want to.132 Obtaining repeal of the offending reg-
ulation might always seem better than a cash settlement that is likely to rep-
resent less than the full diminution in value of the property.133 But this over-
looks the dynamics around land development. Time is often of the essence 
when it comes to developing property.134 The carrying costs associated with 
owning land, and especially of construction loans and the financing of de-
velopment projects, means that delays can kill off projects as surely as any-
thing.135 An adverse regulatory action may therefore stop a development in 
its tracks. Even if the municipality ultimately changes its mind—perhaps 
due to the threat of takings litigation—the damage to the development pro-
ject may already have been done; market conditions may have changed, 
competitors may have obtained an insurmountable advantage, and so 
forth.136 In that case, the developer may actually prefer to take some money 
and get out. 
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Indeed, the dynamics here are interestingly different from the few other 
contexts in which scholars have addressed the possibility of strategic pleading 
by plaintiffs to trigger insurance. For tort claims, and even shareholder class 
actions, plaintiffs will often craft their pleadings to avoid an exclusion.137 In 
those cases, the insurer may have the deepest pockets, and so triggering in-
surance is necessary in order to get paid.138 That is not a problem for plaintiffs 
suing local governments, which can raise taxes or issue debt to fund takings 
liability.139 Of course, developers will often prefer to have the government 
withdraw a burdensome regulation than to receive damages. The pure finan-
cial benefits of having an adverse land use decision reversed may be much 
greater than the damages available under the Takings Clause.140 The point 
here is simply that developers may sometimes prefer damages. 
The resulting dynamic is counterintuitive. The constitutional remedy 
for a takings violation is damages, and specifically just compensation 
measured by the diminution in value resulting from the regulation.141 The 
typical remedy for a substantive due process or equal protection violation, 
however, is injunctive relief, striking down the regulation.142 Likewise, a 
Mount Laurel claim can give rise to a builder’s remedy, allowing the devel-
opment to proceed as of right.143 These claims may also come with damag-
es, especially through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.144 But plaintiffs pursuing these 
                                                                                                                 
 137 See Pryor, supra note 98, at 1732–34 (describing reasons why plaintiffs sometimes prefer 
triggering insurance coverage). 
 138 See id. at 1726 (“If a defendant has insufficient noninsurance assets to satisfy the potential 
tort judgment, then plaintiffs, quite naturally, will have an incentive to evade an intentional-harm 
exclusion.”). 
 139 See Rosenthal, supra note 132, at 832. 
 140 Just compensation frequently ignores categories of losses like consequential damages that 
would be necessary to make a property owner or developer truly whole. See Christopher Serkin, 
The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
677, 700–01 (2005). 
 141 See id. 
 142 See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 
YALE L.J. 385, 490–93 (1977) (describing and criticizing the assumption that remedy for due 
process violation is injunctive relief); cf. Warren v. City of Athens, 411 F.3d 697, 709, 711–12 
(6th Cir. 2005) (finding shop owners were entitled to permanent injunctive relief removing barri-
cades blocking their drive-through that the city installed because the city violated their procedural 
due process rights); Layman Lessons, Inc. v. City of Millersville, 636 F. Supp. 2d 620, 651–52, 
656 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (granting summary judgment after finding the city violated a religious 
organization’s substantive due process rights by relying on the city planner’s representation that 
adjacent property was residential to enforce an inapplicable “buffer strip” regulation, but denying 
permanent injunction for failure to show irreparable harm). 
 143 S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 452–53 (N.J. 
1983). 
 144 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Robert L. Pratter & Joanne Alfano Baker, The Status of Personal 
Liability and Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Coverage of Civil Rights Damages, 48 
INS. COUNS. J. 259, 259 (1981) (“Enacted in 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 grants a right of recovery for 
 
482 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:463 
claims are, in general, mostly interested in obtaining property rule protec-
tion. Municipal insurance coverage, however, reverses the wires. A devel-
oper seeking damages will be well advised to bring claims primarily for 
injunctive relief in order to induce a settlement offer from the insurer, while 
a developer seeking a favorable regulatory outcome should bring an action 
exclusively for just compensation under the Takings Clause, thereby avoid-
ing insurance and pressuring the government to capitulate.145 
III. EXPANDING INSURANCE FOR TAKINGS LIABILITY 
These dynamics around municipal insurance for land use litigation are 
provocative, but what should happen? Courts could—and many courts do—
eliminate the ability to plead around municipal insurance by simply expand-
ing the inverse condemnation exclusion to cover all land-use related 
claims.146 But this is no solution.147 It requires interpretive gymnastics, and 
it then leaves local governments without insurance for an even broader cat-
egory of claims, potentially transferring even more power into the hands of 
developers and private property owners, and leading to under-regulation 
and under-enforcement of land use and environmental regulations.148 The 
ability of plaintiffs to plead strategically to avoid insurance puts municipali-
ties in a tough spot, but it is even worse if insurance is never available.149 
The opposite approach is also problematic. The asymmetry in insur-
ance coverage for different kinds of claims arising out of fundamentally the 
same underlying acts allows for pleading arbitrage by creative plaintiffs’ 
lawyers. This problem is not unique to land use litigation, nor to insurance. 
Pleading decisions are often affected by considerations outside the merits of 
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the claims.150 Plaintiffs, for example, choose whether to include a federal 
claim in state court partly to control whether a defendant can remove to 
federal court.151 Such strategic choices are at least in tension with the goals 
of a genuinely merits-based resolution of the dispute. It may be, for exam-
ple, that equal protection is the most serious constitutional challenge to 
some government action, but that the plaintiff avoids it purely to avoid the 
municipality’s insurance coverage. 
Such pleading arbitrage comes with potentially serious consequences 
to property owners, as well. Ignoring some claims for the purpose of avoid-
ing insurance coverage waives those claims. More generally, it risks leaving 
potentially meritorious constitutional claims unresolved. While such 
gamesmanship occurs frequently, it is not to be lauded. Structural pressures 
away from merits-based litigation should be viewed skeptically. 
The best response may then be to fill the hole in the municipal insur-
ance coverage by extending insurance to regulatory takings claims. In other 
work, I argue that private insurance markets should be able to provide this 
coverage once certain information barriers are overcome.152 That is, there 
are no insurmountable impediments to a private market for regulatory tak-
ings claims.153 But even if that is wrong, or if the market fails to provide 
insurance for a variety of reasons, the state can step in to provide this insur-
ance as a kind of subsidy for local land use and environmental regulations. 
Upstreaming takings risk from small risk-averse local governments to large 
risk-neutral states is welfare-enhancing, and can be structured in a way that 
avoids or at least minimizes the risk of moral hazard.154 It would fundamen-
tally change the opportunity for pleading arbitrage. If the state is defending 
local governments and indemnifying them for liability, it will be more diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to use the threat of takings litigation to strong-arm local 
officials. 
This is particularly attractive when it comes to climate change. A state 
wanting to incentivize local regulatory responses to climate change could 
offer grants or other direct state funding, but local risk aversion means those 
                                                                                                                 
 150 See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Roots of Removal, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 
1, 39 (2011) (indicating that a plaintiff can attempt to avoid federal subject matter jurisdiction by 
suing under state law); Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 
609, 652 (2004) (noting that a plaintiff can avoid removal by disguising “a claim based on federal 
law as a state law claim”); see also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841 (1989) (re-
fusing to view a claim pled under state law as arising under federal law even if the tribe would 
have immunity under federal law). 
 151 See Serkin, supra note 1, at 31–32 
 152 See id. at 49. 
 153 See id. 
 154 See id. 
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grants will be discounted. A better response—or at least an additional one—
would include the state indemnifying local governments for any resulting 
takings litigation. This might have more of an impact on local regulatory 
incentives than even direct grants, and could also prove to be much cheaper 
for states.155 
CONCLUSION 
Land use law too often ignores the impact of municipal insurance. The 
absence of insurance for regulatory takings claims, in particular, has the 
potential to distort regulatory incentives. But, as this Article argues, it also 
generates interpretive challenges for courts. How broadly should the regula-
tory takings exclusion be applied? Courts that expand it to include almost 
all land use litigation do so at the risk of flouting basic interpretive canons. 
Those that read the exclusion narrowly create the possibility of pleading 
arbitrage and strategic litigation choices that may be in tension with the goal 
of resolving legal claims on the merits. Whatever the resolution, shining 
additional light on this lacunae in municipal insurance helps to explain and 
problematize strategic choices in land use litigation. 
                                                                                                                 
 155 For a full exploration of this proposal, see generally Serkin, supra note 1. 
